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In this article, I firstly discuss why a prioritarian clause can rescue the utilitarian doctrine from 
the risk of exacerbating inequality in the distribution of resources in those cases in which utility 
of income does not decline at the margin. Nonetheless, when in the presence of adaptive prefer-
ences, classic prioritarianism is more likely than utilitarianism to increase the inequality of re-
sources under all circumstances, independently of the diminishing trend of utility. Hence, I pro-
pose to shift the informational focus of prioritarianism from welfare to either social income or 
capabilities in order to safeguard those who are worse off. Following this, I argue that we may 
have reasons to limit the aggregative logic of priority-amended utilitarianism through one or more 
sufficiency thresholds, and that we can partially defuse the negative-thesis objection that is usually 
levelled against sufficientarianism, provided we interpret the threshold(s) as valid only as long as 
everyone is led above it.  
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Both prioritarianism and sufficientarianism have usually been presented and dis-
cussed in relation to egalitarianism and as valuable alternatives to it, since they are 
two theories of distributive justice that are not influenced by relativities between in-
dividuals but only by absolute levels of wellbeing. Roughly speaking, prioritarianism 
is the view that justice commands recognizing the priority of the worse off in the 
redistribution of benefits, by assigning a decreasing value to the benefits accruing to 
any potential recipient as we move from those individuals who experience low levels 
of welfare up to those who enjoy the highest levels
1
. Meanwhile, the proponents of 
the sufficiency principle hold that duties of distributive justice are fulfilled when 
every individual is provided with the means for meeting a sufficiency threshold—or 
 
1 This is the welfarist version of prioritarianism that I shall criticize later on. 
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in other words, when everyone is given enough. Obviously, what kinds of things 
people should have in order to stay above the sufficiency threshold and how we 
should evaluate individual positions are open to debate and marked by consistent 
differences among sufficientarian philosophers. 
In this article I discuss the prioritarian and sufficientarian doctrines not in relation 
to egalitarianism, but rather as improved variations of utilitarianism. I move from 
the consideration that prioritarianism represents an advance on utilitarianism be-
cause, by renouncing what Amartya Sen has defined as the ‘“hidden” egalitarianism 
in utilitarian philosophy’
2
, and which consists in the tenet of equality of individual 
utility functions, prioritarianism is able to avoid the inegalitarian drifts that occur 
within utilitarianism when utility does not decline at the margin as expected. Indeed, 
in the latter case the utility principle tends to favour the better off3 for the simple 
reason that they manage to get more utility than the worse off from an equal basket 
of resources – differently from those other cases in which utility decreases at the 
margin and thus the utility principle leads toward an egalitarian distribution of re-
sources. Moreover, I shall also argue that if we shift from a welfarist interpretation 
of prioritarianism—which is dominant in the literature—to alternative versions of pri-
oritarianism that weigh utility on either income or capabilities, we could solve the 
utilitarian problem of the mental distortions stemming from the psychological phe-
nomenon of adaptive preferences.  
Meanwhile, sufficientarianism represents an amended form of priority-amended 
utilitarianism, because it allows us to grant priority to those who are worst off while 
preventing the trade-offs between the bottom and the top of society, which is al-
lowed in prioritarianism. So, in the final analysis, the theoretical evolution from util-
itarianism to prioritarianism first, and from prioritarianism to sufficientarianism 
next, does leave us with a normative account of justice that provides us with the 
philosophical tools for preserving the interests of the poorest and partially maintains 
– up to the sufficiency threshold - the aggregative spirit that is at the heart of the 
utilitarian doctrine, but obliges us to remain silent - from the point of view of justice 
- about inequalities occurring among those individuals who live above sufficiency. 
The latter would imply, as rightly highlighted by Paula Casal, that from a classical 
sufficientarian perspective, we ‘cannot support the preference for progressive over 
regressive taxes’, not simply among the super-rich but also among the super-rich 
and those who barely have enough for living a decent life
4
. 
In other words, sufficientarianism can safeguard people who are in dire need in 
a much more effective way than both utilitarianism and prioritarianism can do, but 
this comes at the price of renouncing axiological incisiveness over the group of the 
better off. This occurs because, differently from other theories of justice advocating 
 
2 Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 13. 
3 In terms of available resources. 
4 Paula Casal, ‘Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough’, Ethics 117, no. 2. (2007): 311. 
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the guarantee of a basic minimum—such as the capability approach, for example—
sufficientarianism is a comprehensive account of distributive justice. It does not 
simply set a minimum threshold as a basic requirement for a wider conception of 
distributive justice5, rather it maintains that the whole discourse about distributive 
justice is exclusively about leading people above the basic threshold. The conse-
quence is that sufficientarianism cannot be coupled with other approaches to justice.  
Therefore, sufficientarianism can be said to consist of both a positive and a neg-
ative thesis. The positive thesis holds that justice requires everyone to have enough 
of something and was initially formulated by Harry Frankfurt in antithesis to the 
egalitarian view, according to which justice consists primarily in equalising the wel-
fare of all the individuals involved in the distributive scheme. Whereas, the negative 
thesis maintains that every individual having enough is the only distributive require-
ment, hence the whole discourse on justice runs out at the sufficiency threshold6.  
In this article, I shall argue that if we interpret sufficientarianism in an alternative 
way, more precisely as consisting of temporary thresholds of sufficiency, we could 
retain the positive thesis of sufficientarianism, while limiting the drawbacks of the 
negative thesis. Accordingly, any given threshold (or series of thresholds
7
) holds its 
normative relevance as long as at least one person is still below it (or them). But 
once the sufficientarian mission has been accomplished, and everyone has finally 
crossed the threshold(s), we can maintain that sufficientarianism has lost its raison 
d’être with respect to that threshold(s), hence we can move on to a different account 
of distributive justice for regulating the interactions between those people who have 
been given ‘enough’, be it egalitarianism, utilitarianism, prioritarianism, libertarian-
ism, and so on.  
Read in this way, sufficientarianism would be an emergency account of justice, 
which will be held in abeyance until any of these two circumstances occur: either 
even one individual gets below the threshold(s) again, hence the old threshold(s) 
gets reactivated, or the emergence of new needs (or the disappearance of old ones) 
lead us to adopt a new threshold(s) of sufficiency. In this latter case, two other things 
may occur: either we conclude that every individual involved in our distributive 
scheme stands above the new threshold(s), and in this case the new threshold(s) 
replaces the old one in the quiescent mode, or we observe that some individuals 
are below the new threshold(s), thus the new threshold(s) becomes immediately 
 
5 Martha Nussbaum is clear when she argues that with the capability approach she is not aiming to 
reject Rawls’s contractualism, but rather to ‘extend[…] [his] principles to cases that he believed a the-
ory like his own could not reach’. See Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, 
Species Membership (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 25. 
6 Both the positive and the negative theses were initially formulated in Harry Frankfurt, ‘Equality 
as a Moral Ideal’, Ethics 98, no. 1 (1987): 21–24. But they were named in this way for the first time 
in Casal, ‘Why Sufficiency’, 297-303. 
7 As we shall see in the next sections, sufficiency can also consist of multiple thresholds, that can 
either be in a vertical or horizontal relation.  
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operative, blocking the other principles of justice that were adopted after the previ-
ous sufficiency threshold(s) got into quiescent mode. 
In the next paragraphs, I will firstly explain the reasons that make prioritarianism 
preferable to utilitarianism and that make sufficientarianism preferable to prioritar-
ianism. Later, I shall put forward the idea of quiescent sufficientarianism based on 
temporary thresholds by also tackling some objections that may be levelled against 
its underlying mechanism and its own definition. In the course of the article, I will 
alternate some considerations on the principles of justice – utility, priority and suf-
ficiency – and on their possible axiological modifications – different weighting fac-
tors, higher/lower/single/multiple thresholds -  with other remarks on the currency 
and the informational focus of justice, namely the ‘things’ that should be redistrib-
uted according to the principle of justice we are considering from time to time and 
the ‘things’ that we can/should take into consideration for assessing the individual 
position in society – realised utility, income, capabilities. 
The final argument is that quiescent sufficiency has the advantage over utilitari-
anism and prioritarianism – in all its variants considered here – to be more radical 
in safeguarding the interests of the worst off, and has the advantage over classic suf-
ficientarianism of allowing to tackle those inequalities that might emerge above the 
threshold, hence preventing the accumulation of excessive wealth at the top of soci-
ety in comparison to the medium strata.  
Quiescent sufficientarianism should be properly interpreted as a reformative po-
litical project aimed at securing a decent living condition for the millions of people 
who are experiencing dire poverty all around the world by temporarily shifting any 
concern of justice from the top to the bottom of society. In other words, sufficien-
tarianism should not be considered as a classic principle of justice, which is valid in 
every circumstance, rather as normative requirement that precedes routinary dis-
tributive justice and whose purpose is to institutionalise a decent life for all.  
 
2. FROM UTILITY TO PRIORITY 
Classical utilitarianism is the ethical theory according to which an action is judged 
to be right if it produces the ‘greatest amount of happiness on the whole […] taking 
into account all whose happiness is affected by the conduct’
8
. In the utilitarian doc-
trine, every ethical subject is endowed with a utility function, and every function 
matters in the same way. In other words, an increase n in utility on the utility func-
tion of agent A has the same value as an equal increase n on the utility function of 
agent B. Meanwhile, an increase n+ on the utility function of agent C is more valu-
able than an increase n occurring to either A or B. Every action occurring in the 
 
8 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1962), 411. 
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world has some consequences on some ethical subjects. An action is said to be 
better if it leads to higher increases in utility for the utility functions of all the subjects 
it affects. The moral mission of every individual consists in maximizing the overall 
utility. 
As we can see from this brief description, there are four fundamental elements 
in the utilitarian theory: welfarism9, an imperative to maximize overall utility, conse-
quentialism, and a hidden form of egalitarianism. The last element is the one that 
interests us most in this article and it could be made explicit in this way: pleasure 
weighs the same independently of who feels it. Utilitarians seek the maximization 
of overall utilities, regardless of how equally they are distributed, and they are ready 
to sacrifice a perfectly equal sum of utilities for a bigger, but much more unequal, 
sum. However, the ‘objective function’ they want to maximize is egalitarian, for util-
itarians ascribe the same value to every utility function
10
. The egalitarianism of utility 
functions is the distinctive trait of utilitarianism that, paradoxically, leads the theory 
toward outcomes that are inegalitarian from the point of view of the distribution of 
resources. In other words, it is the characteristic that causes utilitarianism to foster 
the interests of the better off to the detriment of the worse off. 
Imagine, for example, that we have to decide whether to allocate an extra benefit 
of €2.000 either to Marco, who is relatively poor, or to Giulio, who is relatively well 
off. Assume also that Marco has freely decided to live his life as a bohemian and 
the satisfaction of his basic desires does not mainly depend on money. He likes to 
frequent bars every night, to buy cheap drinks, to write experimental novels, and, in 
general, what he craves the most is to be recognized as an intellectual. While Giulio 
lives only to buy clothes and accessories for his cars. His happiness lies in collecting 
goods that he can show off when going out with his friends. Both in terms of welfare 
and resources Giulio is better off than Marco. Nonetheless, imagine that Giulio 
would gain more utility from an extra benefit of €2.000 than Marco. We might say 
that if we allocate €2.000 to Giulio we would yield 20 marginal units of utility (UG 
20) while if we give the same money to Marco we would only yield 17 marginal units 
(UM 17). This can occur for several reasons. The main reason is that an equal 
marginal increase of money has a stronger effect on Giulio’s dominant life-goal—
showing off luxury commodities—than on Marco’s one—being appreciated in his 




9 Utilitarians disagree on what constitutes welfare. Some of them argue that welfare is the product 
of mental states (the most common example being hedonism), some others look at the satisfaction of 
preferences (either first-order or second-order preferences) or at ‘objective’ elements that are taken 
to be valuable for everyone. See also Tim Mulgan, Understanding Utilitarianism (Stocksfield Hall, 
UK:  Acumen, 2007), 61–92. 
10 Sen, Inequality, 12–14. 
11 Consider also the importance of the ‘utility thresholds’, discussed in Frankfurt, ‘Equality’, 27–
30. 
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In these circumstances, utilitarians would opt for the outcome that reinforces the 
inequality of welfare and of resources. They would allocate the money to Giulio 
because, through this, he would realise a higher marginal increase of utility than 
Marco; hence, this move would be preferable in terms of aggregate utility. This is a 
result that can be hardly accepted by those who believe in the moral principle that—
setting aside any issue of deserts and responsibilities—we cannot let those who have 
more, both in terms of welfare and resources, take precedence over those who have 
less. Moreover, although the utilitarian doctrine does not look at equality in the 
distribution but only at the total sum of utilities, this is not because utilitarians are 
indifferent to the conditions of the worse off. Rather, they believe that if overall 
utility has been maximized, this has occurred because resources have been allocated 
where their utility declines less at the margin—in other words, they have been allo-
cated to the worse off
12
. Therefore, I believe that the idea of allocating the extra 
benefit to Giulio rather than to Marco should in some way also trouble those think-
ers who have appealed to the utilitarian principle for advocating radical schemes of 
redistribution (including global redistribution) from the better off to the worse off
13
.   
One way for utilitarians to get out of this theoretical trap is to renounce the egal-
itarianism of utility functions and to accept the prioritarian principle, according to 
which the value of a benefit is not an absolute value, rather it gets lower the better 
off the recipient is
14
. Therefore, in our case, prioritarians would not deny that €2.000 
would bring more utility to Giulio than to Marco, and in relation to this extra benefit, 
they would accept that UG=20 while UM=17. But prioritarians would go further 
and say that we should not be satisfied with these results, rather we should weigh 
them based on the welfare level of the recipients
15
. So, they would take into account 
that Giulio is better off than Marco in terms of welfare, hence they would assign 
different weighting factors to the two potential recipients—say, 5 to Giulio and 7 to 
 
12 But my point in this article is that this utilitarian assumption does not hold true in every circum-
stance.  
13 See, for example, Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save: How To Play Your Part in Ending 
World Poverty (London: Picador, 2010). 
14 See the first famous formulation of the prioritarian view given by Derek Parfit in his Lindley 
Lecture, ‘Equality or Priority’ of 1991: ‘benefiting people matters more the worse off these people 
are’14. Derek Parfit, ‘Equality and Priority’, Ratio 10, no. 3 (1997): 213. However, it is important to 
clarify that from the fact that utilitarians could renounce the egalitarianism of utility function we cannot 
infer that they might have normative reasons for doing it. Accordingly, my aim here is simply to dis-
cuss how utilitarians could safeguard the interests of the worst off without giving up on moral aggrega-
tion and welfarism. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to clarify this point.   
On the difference between the prioritarian and the utilitarian function, see also Nils Holtug, ‘The-
ories of Value Aggregation: Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, Prioritarianism’, in The Oxford Handbook 
of Value Theory, eds. Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 277; 
and Iwao Hirose, Egalitarianism (London: Routledge, 2014), 91–92.   
15 For now, I accept the assumption made by the majority of prioritarian thinkers that we should 
look at the welfare level of individuals. Later on, I challenge this assumption and argue that we should 
focus instead on resources or capabilities.  
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Marco. In the sense that the value of any benefit accruing to the two can only be 
obtained by weighting the utility that the benefit yields on their utility curve—which 
obviously varies according to the benefit—on their personal weighting factors—that 
remain stable as long as their welfare level does not change. 
Therefore, prioritarians would conclude that the value of €2.000 accruing to 
Marco is higher than if it were accruing to Giulio: VG(of €2.000) = UG(20) *5 = 
100; VM(of €2.000) = UM(17) * 7 = 119. Given that also prioritarianism is an ag-
gregative theory
16
, it would recommend allocating the extra benefit where it tends to 
maximize overall value—that is to say, to Marco rather than to Giulio. So, by extend-
ing the discourse at the policy level, we can notice how the priority principle can 
guide the decision-maker towards the implementation of public policies that are 
more egalitarian than the ones commanded by the utilitarian principle. 
The upshot is that prioritarianism can be considered as a form of amended util-
itarianism, because when the utility of income does not decline at the margin as 
expected - hence an additional good produces a higher marginal utility if given to a 
person who has more goods rather than to the one who has less - the utilitarian 
doctrine tends to favour the wealthier potential recipient of benefits over the poorer 
one, while prioritarianism tends to do the opposite. Therefore, if utilitarians incor-
porate the prioritarian weighting factors in their calculations, they could preserve 
welfarism and aggregation while correcting for the inegalitarian drifts that emerge in 
a case as the one we have just examined. Conversely, in those other cases in which 
utility decreases at the margin, this further guarantee would not overturn the utilitar-
ian results but only reinforce them
17
.  
However, some cases do exist in which the prioritarian variant that is dominant 
in the literature, according to which the individual weighting factor should be in 
inverse proportion to welfare levels (welfare-prioritarianism
18
), might fall short of its 
commitment to giving priority to the worse off, up to the point of exacerbating the 
limits that utilitarianism has with interpersonal comparisons. I am referring to those 
 
16 See Nils Holtug, ‘Prioritarianism’, in Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of 
Equality, eds. Nils Holtug and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
134. 
17 In other words, in the more common situations in which the utility of money does really diminish 
at the margin, prioritarian weighting factors would reinforce the egalitarian tendency of utilitarianism. 
Imagine this were the case in our previous example. So, assume that Marco would obtain more utility 
than Giulio from an extra benefit of €2.000. We might say that in relation to this benefit, UM=20 and 
UG=17 (the opposite of what I have postulated in the text). In this case, the prioritarian clause would 
not alter the utilitarian normative claim that we should allocate the benefit to Marco (UM>UG) but 
would only strengthen it, because VM=20*7=140 while UG=17*5=85. So, VM – VG > UM – UG. 
Hence, from a prioritarian view, it is even more important to benefit Marco than from the utilitarian 
perspective.  
18 See, for example, Holtug, ‘Prioritarianism’, 132; Hirose, Egalitarianism, 89–99; and Richard 
Arneson, ‘Egalitarianism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Sum-
mer 2013 Edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/ egalitarianism/>. 
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situations in which individuals have developed adaptive preferences – that is to say, 
when they have experienced a state of continuous deprivation up to the point of 
having become accustomed to it and having substantially lowered their expecta-
tions
19
. When this phenomenon occurs, such that among two potential recipients of 
a benefit the wealthier is less happy and the poorer is more happy, prioritarianism 
performs badly towards the poorer individual in all circumstances, while utilitarian-
ism might still prefer the poorer person over the wealthier one on the condition 
that, in relation to the benefit we are discussing, utility does not decline at the mar-
gin. 
Consider the case of a girl who is born in a poor and patriarchal society where 
women are denied education and basic liberties. This girl—let’s call her Francesca—
has spent the first part of her life in her parents’ house simply waiting to be married 
off, which is considered to be the culmination of her adulthood. Now, also imagine 
that this girl, having been raised in a society where women do not entertain any 
higher expectations than becoming ‘wives’, is quite happy with her condition. She 
feels like she is following her only path in life, she believes that it is right for her to 
be subjugated to her husband. Given these premises, it might happen that she 
reaches a much higher utility level in staying home, performing household work, 
with no other available option in life, than another woman who lives in a wealthy 
and liberal society, is formally free to pursue any life path, but is deeply unsatisfied 
because she has not been able to live up to her expectations. We could think of 
another woman, for example, who has entertained for all her youth the dream of 
becoming a famous chef. She has spent many years studying for it and has sacrificed 
her private life. But after many failures, she has been unable to fulfil her plans for 
life and has finally ended up doing a more modest job in a restaurant. Assume also 
that, for all the reasons stated above, this second woman—let’s call her Claudia—
experiences constant anger and frustration. Therefore, despite being substantially 
poorer and constrained in the life choices available to her, Francesca is more satis-
fied than Claudia.  
Now, imagine that you have to decide whether to allocate an extra benefit B to 
the first or to the second woman. Here, we might have two possible scenarios. In 
the first one, benefit B yields more utility if it is assigned to Claudia. This might 
happen, for example, if the beneficial effect of B on Claudia’s frustration—think of 
B as a holiday, or as extra money for shopping, or something similar— is superior 
to the marginal increase in happiness that Francesca might have with B. In this case, 
 
19 Consequently, their level of happiness and satisfaction is much higher than it would have been 
had this process of adaptation not occurred. See also Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 62–63, 67–70; and Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 
111–166. 
The example of Giulio and Marco is simply a case of utility that does not decrease at the margin, 
rather than a case of adaptive preferences, because I postulate that they have freely developed their 
tastes and plans of life. 
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both utilitarianism and prioritarianism would recommend allocating B to the per-
son with the lower welfare level—Claudia, the restaurant girl—even though she is 
much wealthier than Francesca.  
Conversely, in the second scenario, we assume that Francesca, the happy wife, 
would get more utility from B than Claudia, the restaurant girl. This may happen if 
Francesca, despite being better off in terms of welfare, is so much poorer than Clau-
dia that the satisfaction she would get from B—or from the commodities she can 
buy with it—is higher than the mitigating effect of B on Claudia’s burning disillusion-
ment. In this case, utilitarians would privilege the poorer—but happier—person over 
the wealthier but less satisfied counterpart. In other words, utilitarians would not fall 
into the trap of adaptive preferences. They would not penalize the persons with 
fewer resources for the sole fact of not suffering for their condition.  
Nonetheless, if in this second scenario we apply the prioritarian clause to the 
utilitarian principle, we could not unconditionally uphold the utilitarian indication. 
On the contrary, we might be forced to reverse it if Claudia’s weighting factor is high 
enough to compensate for her disadvantage in the utility produced by benefit B. 
Consider, for example, that B yields a marginal utility of 14 if given to Francesca 
(UF=14) and of 12 if given to Claudia (UC=12), and that Francesca’s welfare level 
corresponds to a weighting factor of 3 while Claudia’s welfare level corresponds to 
a weighting factor of 5. The value of B accruing to Francesca would be VF=14*3=42, 
while the value of B accruing to Claudia would be VC=12*5= 60. Therefore, VC > 
VF, and for prioritarians, in this second scenario, B should be given to Claudia, the 
wealthier person, rather than to the poorer one as utilitarians would maintain.  
Cutting a long story short, the problem with utilitarianism is that when the utility 
of income does not decline at the margin as expected, hence an additional good 
produces an higher marginal utility if given to a person who has more goods rather 
than to the one who has less, the utilitarian doctrine tends to favour the wealthier 
potential recipient of benefits over the poorer one. But the prioritarian amendment 
can rescue the utilitarian principle from the risk of this moral inconsistency. 
Whereas, when we are in the presence of adaptive preferences, prioritarianism al-
ways penalises the worse off individual, while utilitarianism can recommend allocat-
ing a given additional benefit to the worse off individual only on condition that the 




20 Or in other words, on condition that the person who is poorer but at a higher utility level does 
obtain more utility from a given additional benefit than a second person who is wealthier but is at a 
lower utility level. Obviously, this would not entail that under such circumstances utilitarianism has 
solved the whole problem with adaptive preferences, because independently from the choice related 
to the allocation of the extra benefit, if you ask a utilitarian to judge which of the two persons is better 
off, she would still indicate the poorer one. Therefore, even when the utility of a given benefit does 
not decline at the margin, hence with regards to this benefit a utilitarian would favor the poorer recip-
ient, the criticisms moved by Sen against the utilitarian indifference toward adaptive preferences still 
hold true. See Sen, Development, 62–63. 
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Does this mean that we should drop both the utilitarian and the prioritarian doc-
trine? Does this also irreparably undermine the hypothesis that prioritarianism 
might represent a positive theoretical evolution of the utilitarian theory in safeguard-
ing the interests of those who have fewer assets and capabilities? I do not believe so. 
For the limits of prioritarianism derive from the fact that this doctrine has generally 
been equated to welfare-prioritarianism. Nonetheless, the prioritarian basic formu-
lation, initially proposed by Derek Parfit, and according to which ‘benefiting people 
matters more the worse off these people are’
21
, does leave open the issue of how we 
should measure, for the purpose of weighting benefits, who is worse off. My point 
is that if we shift from welfare-prioritarianism—that is, the formulation that in the 
literature has generally been associated with the wider prioritarian idea—to other 
variants of prioritarianism that adopt different informational foci
22
 – as for example 
resources or capabilities – prioritarianism might perform better than utilitarianism 
with regard to the poorer people even in the presence of adaptive preferences. 
Consider how Nils Holtug automatically proceeds from the general principle of 
prioritarianism to welfare-prioritarianism. He first offers the following formulation 
of what he defines as ‘Overall Outcome Welfare Prioritarianism’: 
‘An Outcome is intrinsically better, the larger a sum of weighted individual benefits 
it contains, where benefits are weighted such that they gain a greater value, the worse 
off the individual to whom they accrue’
23
. 
Such a principle, taken by itself, is not yet welfarist; rather, it is the analytical 
formula of the generic prioritarian doctrine. But it becomes welfarist a few lines later 
when Holtug specifies that prioritarianism ‘ascribes intrinsic values to compound 
states of affairs’
24
, each consisting of the size of the benefit and of the welfare level 
of the individual who receives it. The higher the welfare level, the lower the com-
pound state will be.  
As I was arguing before, nothing is granted in the move from Holtug’s formula-
tion of ‘Overall Outcome Welfare Prioritarianism’ to his further specification. Be-
cause following Sen’s famous argument, we can judge ‘a person’s position in a social 
arrangement’ either in terms of realized achievements, means to achievement, or 
freedom to achieve
25
. Welfare-prioritarians adopt the first criterion, ascribing a low 
weighting factor to a person who gets low welfare out of her bundle of resources, 
independently of how wide this bundle is and how many freedoms she can obtain 
with the resources at her disposal. The consequence, as we have seen, is that wel-
fare-prioritarianism is presented as a theory that aims to give priority to the worse 
 
21 Parfit, ‘Equality and Priority’, 213. 
22 ‘informational focus’ is an expression that I borrow from Sen, Development, 72.  
23 Holtug, ‘Prioritarianism’, 133. 
24 Holtug, ‘Prioritarianism’, 132. 
25 Sen, Inequality, 31–38. See also Sen, Development, 72–76. 
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off but that ends up exacerbating the utilitarian indifference to poverty when poverty 
does not result in the level of dissatisfaction that we would normally expect.   
A solution for rescuing prioritarianism from this limit can consist—and in my view 
should consist—in changing the ‘informational focus’ of prioritarianism. It needs to 
shift from welfare-prioritarianism to two other prioritarian variants that we might 
label as income-prioritarianism and capability-prioritarianism. I shall place the latter 
principles in analytical terms by modifying the definition of welfare prioritarianism 
that Holtug has provided
26
. 
Income-prioritarianism: An Outcome is intrinsically better, the larger a sum of 
weighted individual benefits it contains, where benefits are weighted such that they 
gain a greater value, the lower the social income
27
 of the individual to whom they 
accrue. 
Capability-prioritarianism: An Outcome is intrinsically better, the larger a sum of 
weighted individual benefits it contains, where benefits are weighted such that they 
gain a greater value, the less the capabilities of the individual to whom they accrue. 
Both versions of prioritarianism would solve the problem that welfare prioritari-
anism has in relation to adaptive preferences. Yet, capability-prioritarianism might 
be preferred to income-prioritarianism because it provides a more accurate concep-
tion of what it means to be better off. Accordingly, two individuals might control 
exactly the same basket of resources and yet occupy two different positions in soci-
ety because either social or individual factors allow them to achieve different func-
tionings, that is to say things they may have reasons to value having or being28. Con-
sider, for example, two persons who have the same income but different chances to 
get a job they might wish for or different recreational opportunities because one of 
them happens to live in a liberal society, while the other lives in authoritarian re-
gime. Or consider also two individuals who live in the same place, control the same 
income, but live two very different lives because one of them suffers from severe 
disabilities.   
On the other hand, income-prioritarianism might be preferred to capability-pri-
oritarianism because it resorts to an informational focus that is easier to calculate; 
hence, it renders the theory more promptly utilizable by policymakers. In other 
words, calculating how many resources a given individual controls is much easier 
than estimating in which different combinations of functionings she can convert the 
resources she has.  
 
26 See Holtug, ‘Prioritarianism’, 133. 
27 The social income of an individual refers to the sum of all the sources of income she can obtain 
in society: from the state (through money transfers or through services), from private employers (both 
in terms of wages and of benefits), from the family, from the community, from self-production, and 
from private activities. See Guy Standing, ‘Labor Recommodification in the Global Transformation’, 
in Reading Karl Polanyi for the Twenty–First Century: Market Economy as a Political Project, eds. 
Ayse Buğra and Kaan Agartan (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), 69.  
28 Sen, Development, 70–76. 
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More specifically, in income-prioritarianism, each person is assigned, for evalua-
tive purposes, a weighting factor that is inversely proportional to the amount of re-
sources she happens to control, without taking into consideration how much welfare 
she manages to get from them. In this way, if person A controls more resources 
than person B, the former could never have a lower weighting factor than the latter, 
regardless of any subjective distortion in evaluation due to adaptive preferences. 
Capability-prioritarianism would follow the same logic. The only difference is that 
it would adopt a broader informational focus, thus enlarging the conception of pov-
erty. It would take into consideration, for the assignment of weighting factors, the 
freedom to achieve things that a person ‘may value doing or being’
29
. Therefore, in 
our previous example, Claudia (the restaurant girl) could never been given a higher 
weighting factor than Francesca (the happy wife) – something that could happen, 
instead, with income-prioritarianism if Francesca, although being denied some basic 
liberties in her patriarchal society, controlled more resources than Claudia. 
I believe that both income-prioritarianism and capability-prioritarianism are pref-
erable to welfare-prioritarianism—and to utilitarianism—for the reasons discussed so 
far. Hence, both theories might be considered for adoption. Capability-prioritarian-
ism is a stronger bulwark for the worse off than income-prioritarianism, but I would 
concede that some would prefer to trade the accuracy of the former for the simplic-
ity of the latter, especially when distributive principles are called in to guide public 
policies and political projects. For the sake of simplicity, in this article I shall con-
tinue to consider prioritarianism in its capability version, always bearing in mind that 
what I will argue about capability-prioritarianism from now on can also be applied, 
although in a more restricted way, to the income version. 
 
3. FROM PRIORITY TO SUFFICIENCY 
Capability-prioritarianism has the advantage, over utilitarianism, of giving priority 
to the poorer individuals even when utility does not decrease at the margin. It has 
the advantage, over welfare-prioritarianism, of not being in the grip of mental dis-
tortions stemming from adaptive preferences. It also has the advantage—like every 





29 Sen, Development, 75. For a brief discussion about how the capabilities have been used in 
practice for the purpose of well-being assessment see Ingrid Robeyns, ‘The Capability Approach in 
Practice’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 14, no. 3 (2006): 360-373. 
30 Telic egalitarianism is the view according to which equality is intrinsically good on its own. 
Hence, a first distribution is at least in one respect better than a second one if it is more equal. The 
consequence is that for a telic egalitarian it is better in one respect to lower the conditions of the better 
off if we cannot ameliorate the situation of the worse off. Parfit has defined this move as ‘leveling 
down’. See Parfit, ‘Equality and Priority’, 210–212. 
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Nonetheless, the challenge of aggregation persists even in capability-prioritarian-
ism. Thus, any individual, no matter how well off she might be, is never assigned a 
weighting factor that is equal to zero. This means that even the benefits accruing to 
the wealthiest individual in the world matter in the global calculus of value. Hence, 
we cannot exclude the possibility of trade-offs between the top and the bottom of 
society, such that a huge set of benefits accruing to a large number of the former 
can outweigh a small set of benefits distributed among the latter. This is a limit, in 
my view, because it makes prioritarianism structurally uncapable of dealing with 
inequalities that the best off seek to defend, at the expenses of the worst off, on the 
grounds of value aggregation.  
Supporters of the prioritarian view might object that I am referring to purely 
speculative cases, because such undesirable trade-offs can only occur under the con-
dition that we were unable to do anything other than choose between allocating 
huge benefits to many from the top or allocating small benefits to a few from the 
bottom. For when we are relatively free to intervene in the distribution, prioritari-
anism would demand that we drive the benefits towards the worse off in order to 
maximize the overall value
31
. Nonetheless, I believe that the case of the transversal 
trade-off should not be lightly dismissed, because we are not always free to assign 
benefits to whoever we wish, and in many cases we are obliged to make black-or-
white choices—more so if we extend the prioritarian principle to the global level
32
.  
In order to clarify this point, imagine that a small group of children living in a 
developing country is forced, because of dire economic conditions, to mine a ma-
terial that is used in micro quantities in the production of smartphones and tablets. 
 
So imagine that in our example benefit B was a ski holiday and that Francesca did not know how 
to ski while Claudia did. Both utilitarians and prioritarians would recommend giving B to Claudia, if 
Francesca cannot get any utility out of it. Meanwhile, telic egalitarians would be forced to admit that, 
at least in one respect, it would be preferable to renounce allocating B instead of giving it to Claudia, 
hence increasing the distance between the two women. (Obviously this would occur under the as-
sumption that the telic egalitarian were interested in equality of resources, with regards to which Clau-
dia is better off than Francesca - if the telic egalitarian were interested in equality of welfare, with 
regards to which Francesca is better off than Claudia, we would have to reverse the ski example).  
31 The problem with prioritarianism is that it would remain indifferent to two outcomes that make 
the same contribution to the overall value, even if in one outcome the whole marginal value is pro-
duced by many at the top and in the second it is produced by a few the bottom – assuming that we 
had no other solution but to choose between one of the two options. 
32 At this point, it might be interesting to wonder whether prioritarianism and sufficientarianism 
are theories of distributive justice that are necessarily global in scope. The great majority of their 
proponents seem to maintain this view (see, for example, Parfit, ‘Equality and Priority’, 214; and 
Robert Huseby, ‘Sufficiency: Restated and Defended’, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 18, no. 2 
[2010]: 279). Nonetheless, I believe that whether you take into consideration the utility, priority, or 
sufficiency of every living (or even future) person or rather you are simply interested in the members 
of a given group depends on the second-order issue of whether you are cosmopolitan or rather na-
tionalist about justice. This is an issue that precedes the debate on utilitarianism, prioritarianism, or 
sufficientarianism and can only be resolved separately. Therefore, I would say that there is no theo-
retical contradiction in proposing statist versions of prioritarianism or sufficientarianism.  
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Assume also that this job is extremely hazardous because of the consequences on 
children’s health and that, on the other hand, smartphones and tablets are the vec-
tors of a considerable portion of the world economy that includes apps, e-com-
merce, communication, and so on (in a few words, a lot of jobs and a lot of money). 
Shall we tolerate that these children shoulder the burden of the wealth of a large 
group of people living in developed countries, even though this means spending 
their lives in obnoxious conditions? If the group of children is small and the sector 
of the world economy based on smartphones and tablets is huge enough, prioritar-
ians would justify this practice
33
. Imagine that we need to choose between allocating 
some resources to 50 child miners who are providing the precious material to com-
pany X in order to lead them to less miserable conditions, and not allocating these 
resources to these children. If these additional resources would make the children 
unwilling to continue working in an unsafe place, thus causing an immediate shock 
for company X, that would hurt its business
34
 and might result in a loss of welfare 
for thousands of employees, then not only from an utilitarian prospective but also 
from a prioritarian one we might still have reasons to prevent the children from 
shifting from ‘miserable’ to ‘less miserable’ conditions
35
.  
In other words, prioritarianism may allow for a trade-off between those who ben-
efit from the extraction of the precious material and the children. For the numerical 
difference between the former and the latter may call off the egalitarian mechanism 
that is implicit in prioritarianism and that in this case consists in the children having 
much higher weighting factors of utilities than their counterparts. Even though the 
children are really bad off, either in terms of welfare, resources or capabilities, hence 
their weighting factors are extremely high, the fact that they are only 50 may render 
the action of benefiting them sub-optimal from the point of view of maximised ag-
gregative value36.  
A solution to this drawback of the prioritarian theory might consist in excluding 
the better off from the aggregative calculus of overall value. This might be realized 
by introducing a threshold, so that all individuals above it have a weighting factor 
that is never higher than zero. In this way, we would impose a sufficientarian clause 
 
33 However, prioritarians might be pluralist. They might hold that in my example other values—
such as freedom from exploitation—matter. So, they might be ready to sacrifice an outcome with a 
higher value, obtained by exploiting children, for an outcome with a lower one, in which there is no 
exploitation. But in every case they would be forced to argue that the first outcome is at least in one 
respect preferable to the second one. See also Holtug, ‘Prioritarianism’, 132.  
34 We are assuming that company X would need time to adjust to the loss of the child miners. 
35 On this issue, see also the famous example of the World Cup final that Casal recently readapted 
from T. M. Scanlon. See Casal ‘Why Sufficiency’, 320; and Thomas M. Scanlon, What We Owe to 
Each Other (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 235. 
36 Here I make no distinction between the different versions of prioritarianism because it would 
not substantially alter my conclusions, in the sense that by changing the currency of justice we would 
not reverse the inegalitarian tendency that the axiological principle of prioritarianism shows in this 
situation. 
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to the prioritarian principle
37
.  And it is also interesting to note how this restriction 
to the aggregative imperative that prioritarianism inherits from utilitarianism is in-
troduced at the price of rendering the outcomes of utility functions even more un-
equal than in prioritarianism. For while prioritarianism holds that individual utilities 
are not the same, but they matter more the worse off the person who produces 
them is, the sufficientarian threshold adds the stricter provision that some utilities—
those of the better off— are excluded from the calculation of overall value. In this 
sense, as we move from utilitarianism towards a distributive principle that better 
sustains the equality of resources or capabilities, we progressively mitigate the ‘hid-
den form of egalitarianism’ that Sen ascribed to the utilitarian doctrine. 
The idea of the sufficientarian threshold was initially proposed by Harry Frank-
furt when he addressed the advocates of economic equality, holding that many of 
them were mistaking a quantitative consideration for a qualitative one. Frankfurt’s 
hypothesis is that many egalitarians intuitively declare considering inequality as un-
acceptable in itself, but what really disturbs many of them is not that some people 
have less than some others, rather, they worry that a given group of individuals has 
too little and lives below a sufficiency threshold
38
.  
But what does it mean to reach a sufficiency threshold? This threshold, Frankfurt 
says, should be interpreted as a standard rather than a limit. In the sense that the 
person who meets the standard would surely prefer to have more money than she 
has, but she has no ‘active interest’ in getting more. This condition may arise under 
two circumstances: when the person has enough money not to be dissatisfied with 
her life, or when she is dissatisfied but this does not depend on economic reasons
39
. 
Therefore, Frankfurt proposed a single and subjective utility threshold to delimit 
the field of action of justice. The only thing that matters is to lead every individual 
above the sufficiency threshold, and obviously the farther a person is from the suf-
ficiency threshold the stronger will be the urgency of driving resources toward her. 
Meanwhile, all the benefits accruing to people above the threshold have no value 
for the distributive calculation. Hence, they cannot be traded with the benefits going 
to people below the threshold
40
.  
However, the idea of the sufficiency threshold can be interpreted—and in fact, it 
has been subsequently interpreted—in many different ways
41
. A sufficiency threshold 
can be either subjective or objective, single or multiple, and when we have multiple 
thresholds, they can be laid in a vertical or horizontal order. Regarding the first 
distinction, an example of a threshold that we might define as objective, because it 
is not based on a self-evaluation—as in the work of Frankfurt—but rather relies on a 
 
37 We might say that the sufficientarian threshold re-amends prioritarian-amended utilitarianism. 
38 See Frankfurt, ‘Equality’, 34.  
39 Frankfurt, ‘Equality’, 39–43.  
40 Differently from prioritarianism.  
41 For an analysis of the non-instrumental reasons that might support a sufficiency threshold, see 
Liam Shields, ‘The Prospects for Sufficientarianism’, Utilitas 24, no. 2 (2012): 112–114. 
540  FAUSTO CORVINO 
 
third-person perspective, is the one proposed by Roger Crisp. More precisely, in 
Crisp’s view, the sufficiency threshold corresponds to the welfare level at which the 
compassion of an impartial spectator gives out. The idea of the virtuous, or impartial 
spectator, is meant to indicate a model in which a third person examines in a neutral 
way the situation of those participating in a scheme of redistribution. In conjunction 
with the notion of compassion, the model of the impartial spectator can suggest an 
absolute threshold. All those for whom the impartial spectator feels compassion are 
below the threshold; all the others are above it
42
. 
In Crisp’s sufficientarianism, individuals below the threshold are to be given ab-
solute priority over those above it in the distribution of benefits. Below the thresh-
old, those who are far from it have a relative priority over those who are closer to it. 
What happens among those above the threshold is irrelevant, but one solution, 
Crisp says, might be to introduce a form of utilitarianism among those who are 
above sufficiency only for the purpose of regulating their interactions. However, no 
trade-offs would be allowed across the threshold. The only exception would relate 
to what Crisp defines as ‘trivial’ benefits: a trivial benefit below the threshold does 
not have priority over a non-trivial one above the threshold
43
.     
Second, other sufficientarian philosophers have felt the need to employ more 
than one threshold vertically. Robert Huseby, for example, has combined an objec-
tive minimal threshold that corresponds to the fulfilment of ‘basic human needs’
44
, 
interpreted mainly as food, shelter, clothing, and physical security, with a subjective 
maximal sufficiency threshold, which is similar to the one employed by Frankfurt 
and ‘equals to a level of welfare with which a person is content’
45
.  
More generally, Huseby’s sufficientarian scheme works in this way. All those be-
low the maximal threshold should have absolute priority over those above it. Be-
tween the maximal threshold and the minimal one there should be a sort of priori-
tarianism. Benefits should be weighted on the distance of the recipient from the 
maximal threshold. Lastly, a ‘strong’ priority should apply to those below the mini-
mal threshold—something less stringent than absolute priority but more radical than 
standard prioritarian weighing
46
.    
Meanwhile, David Axelsen and Lasse Nielsen have preferred to distinguish be-
tween different objective thresholds horizontally, referring to central human 
 
42 Roger Crisp, ‘Equality, Priority and Compassion’, Ethics 113, no. 4 (2003): 755–757.  
43 Crisp, ‘Equality, Priority’, 758. 
44 Huseby, ‘Sufficiency’, 180. 
45 Huseby, ‘Sufficiency’, 181. However, talking about contentment with individual welfare opens 
up a huge problem with regard to those people who have expensive tastes. So, Huseby says that one 
solution to this conundrum consists in replacing ‘contentment’ with ‘a reasonable chance of being 
content’. Huseby, ‘Sufficiency’, 182. 
Moreover, Huseby’s maximal sufficiency threshold is also influenced by relative deprivation, be-
cause relativities have a psychological impact on individual contentedness. Huseby, ‘Sufficiency’, 183. 
46 Huseby, ‘Sufficiency’, 184–185. 
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capabilities that go from the classical basic needs—such as food, health, and educa-
tion—to more complex ones—such as political freedom, social respect, and so on. 
A person reaches sufficiency, in their view, when she is free from pressure against 
succeeding in each central capability
47
. So, no matter how positive the self-evaluation 
of wellbeing of the happy wife of my example could be, she would never be consid-
ered above sufficiency unless she meets all the separate sufficiency thresholds that 
Axelsen and Nielsen indicate as basic
48
.  
For the various reasons expressed so far, I would tend to consider an impartial 
version of sufficiency, either based on a third-person prospective or referring to 
some capabilities that enshrine basic interests, as preferable to subjective thresholds 
that, being based on personal contentment, run the risk to falling prey to adaptive 
preferences or to expensive tastes – as exemplified in the cases of Francesca-Claudia 
and Giulio-Marco, respectively.  
 
4. QUIESCENT SUFFICIENCY 
Up until this point, I have discussed why by first applying either the income-
prioritarian or the capability-prioritarian clause to utilitarianism and by later intro-
ducing one or more impartial sufficiency thresholds, we obtain a distributive princi-
ple that preserves the advantages of both utilitarianism and prioritarianism, while 
correcting for some of their most severe drawbacks that penalize poorer persons.  
The advantages of both utilitarianism and prioritarianism are clarity in moral pre-
scription, consequentialism and impartiality in moral aggregation, while the disad-
vantages are, respectively, to point toward an unequal distribution of resources when 
utility does not decrease at the margin (in the case of utilitarianism) and the inability 
to prevent dramatic trade-offs between the top and the bottom of society (which is 
more evident in utilitarianism but can also characterise prioritarianism when there 
is a large numerical disparity between the better off and the worse off).  
Nonetheless, one might still object that an important difference exists between 
simple prioritarianism and sufficiency-amended prioritarianism with regards to the 
way we conceive of priority among those who are below the sufficiency threshold. 
For while prioritarians would hold that we ought to allocate resources to the worse 
 
47 They use the expression ‘freedom from duress’. David V. Axelsen and Lasse Nielsen, ‘Suffi-
ciency as Freedom from Duress’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 23, no. 4 (2015): 406–409. 
Moreover, Axelsen and Nielsen also argue that while certain thresholds only require an evaluation 
of absolute positions, for some others we should also look at relativities. The vote, for example, is a 
‘positional good’, whose absolute relevance is dependent on the absolute number of votes that all the 
other people are allowed to express. Axelsen and Nielsen, ‘Freedom from Duress’, 419-421. See also 
the more recent Lasse Nielsen and David V. Axelsen, ‘Capabilitarian Sufficiency: Capabilities and 
Social Justice’, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 18, no. 1 (2017): 46-59. 
48 See Axelsen and Nielsen, ‘Freedom from Duress’, 410-411. 
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off in every case, sufficientarians might maintain that when resources are scarce—
and hence we cannot lead everyone above the threshold in the short run—it might 
be more important to lead closer to sufficiency those individuals who are not far 
from it rather than those others who are so poor that we have less reason to expect 
that they will manage to reach sufficiency on their own. 
Consider, for example, a case in which A controls 20 units of resources, B owns 
28, C owns 65, and the sufficiency threshold is fixed at 70 units of resources. As-
sume that you have only three units to allocate and you have to decide where to 
place them. Prioritarians would have no doubts that A should be given priority. 
With sufficientarians, the discourse is more complex. In those cases in which the 
process of redistribution is constant, I think that the great majority of sufficientarians 
would agree with prioritarians on the urgency of giving extra resources to those who 
fare worse. Whereas, if we can reasonably expect that no other additional resources 
will be available for redistribution in the near future, and that the recipients are not 
likely to substantially ameliorate their conditions without external intervention
49
, suf-
ficientarians might deem it more urgent to bring C very close to the sufficiency 
threshold rather than give priority to the worse off, as prioritarians would recom-
mend
50
.   
I recognize that this difference can exist and hence that sufficiency-amended pri-
oritarianism might entail a modification of the prioritarian logic below the threshold. 
Nonetheless, I believe that we would not incur any theoretical contradiction if we 
hold that sufficientarianism remains open to the two different normative strategies 
in those cases in which resources are limited—that is, either the maximization of 
value at all costs or the priority to those who are more likely to reach the sufficiency 
threshold.  
However, the irreconcilable difference between prioritarianism and sufficientar-
ianism, the one that many identify as being the biggest limit of the latter, is the indif-
ference to inequalities occurring above the threshold. For if up to a certain threshold 
 
49 Imagine, for example, the case of aid intervention with very limited resources, in an area lashed 
by dire poverty. 
50 See, for example, Edward Page, ‘Justice Between Generations: Investigating a Sufficientarian 
Approach’, Journal of Global Ethics 3, no. 1 (2007): 9. See also the ‘headcount claim’ discussed by 
Shields with regards to some sufficientarian theories, and according to which ‘benefits to those who 
do not reach the threshold do not improve the assessment of the distribution’. Shields, ‘The Pro-
spects’, 102–103.  
A different case would be that in which you are dealing with a life-or-death situation and you have 
limited resources. Hence, you have to decide whether to ameliorate the condition of the worse off, 
without saving their lives, or guarantee the survival of the better off. Consider a re-elaboration of my 
previous example, in which you have five rather than three resources to give, and 70 is the minimum 
for staying alive. Here I believe sufficientarians would want to give five resources to C (see Frankfurt, 
‘Equality’, 30–31), and prioritarians would do the same, because even though C has a lower weighting 
factor than both A and B, the marginal increase of utility yielded by five additional resources is much 
higher on C’s utility function than on those of A or B.   
543  Utility, Priorities, and Quiescent Sufficiency 
 
 
individual weighting factors become equal to zero, we lose any axiological leverage. 
Various solutions can be proposed to the problem of how we regulate the distribu-
tion above sufficiency. One solution, as postulated by Crisp, might consist in apply-




Another possible solution might be to employ negative weighting factors above 
the threshold
52
, that are closer to zero the lower the income level of the persons they 
refer to, and vice versa. In this way, we would have a form of positive priority below 
the threshold and a form of negative priority above it. Also above the threshold the 
value of a benefit would be given by the utility weighted on a weighting factor that is 
inversely proportional to the income level of the recipient, but given that all the 
weighting factors above the threshold would be lower than zero, there could never 
be a trade-off between a person above sufficiency and a person below it.  
I believe that both strategies can result in workable principles of justice, but they 
would contradict the core of the sufficientarian doctrine—initially developed in an-
tithesis to egalitarianism—according to which justice only requires that everyone has 
enough
53
. Yet, I maintain that a possibility exists for rescuing sufficientarianism from 
the allegation of indifference to all inequalities occurring above sufficiency—let’s call 
it “the indifference objection”54—without contradicting the original sufficientarian 
spirit. It consists in holding that justice only requires that everyone has enough as 
long as everyone has obtained enough. According to this view, absolute priority 
would be granted to those below sufficiency, with capability-prioritarianism regulat-
ing the priority in the below-sufficiency group, and any inequality in the above-suf-
ficiency group would remain outside the scope of justice. But when no one is left 
below the threshold, the sufficiency principle will become dormant and we could 
shift to whatever other principle of justice we deem correct for regulating society 
under the new contingencies. 
 
51Crisp, ‘Equality, Priority’, 758. Consider also the hybrid formulation of sufficientarian egalitari-
anism proposed by Andrew Williams. Within this doctrine, luck egalitarianism holds as the general 
principle of justice, with the restriction that any form of option luck can justify any person being left 
below a minimum level of welfare. See Andrew Williams, ‘Liberty, Equality, and Property”, in The 
Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, eds. John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig and Anne Phillips (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 501–503.  
52 While sufficientarians do usually hold that weighting factors are equal to zero, here I refer to 
weighting factors preceded by the minus sign. 
53 In the sense that we can technically introduce an additional distributive principle, but in so doing 
we would end up outside the sufficientarian field. Whereas, Philipp Kanschik has defended the idea 
that sufficientarianism is reconcilable with progressive taxation by appealing to the risk of falling below 
the threshold. Accordingly, it would not be incoherent, from a sufficientarian prospective, to tax less 
those who are closer to the sufficiency threshold. Yet, I am not sure that the proponents of the suffi-
cientarian view on justice would accept the normative relevance of being at risk of insufficiency.  See 
Philipp Kanschik, ‘Why Sufficientarianism is not Indifferent to Taxation’, Kriterion – Journal of Phi-
losophy 29, no. 2 (2015): 89–98. 
54 Shields, ‘The Prospects’, 106. 
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Interpreted in this way, sufficientarianism would be conceived of as an emer-
gency principle of justice that we adopt to grant absolute priority to those people 
who experience extraordinary deprivation. We might call this form of sufficientari-
anism that I am proposing here as quiescent sufficientarianism. More than a generic 
principle of justice, quiescent sufficientarianism is a temporary distributive principle 
aimed at accomplishing a specific objective: enabling all members of society to meet 
a basic wellbeing threshold. In other words, sufficiency should not simply be seen 
as a regulative ideal aimed at guiding political choices, the way that priority, utility, 
and equality are. Rather, it should be viewed as an achievable goal, consisting in 
correcting for a more urgent form of injustice: living below sufficiency. 
Naturally, quiescent sufficientarianism would not be able to meet the indiffer-
ence objection in its entirety, because even with this version of sufficiency we would 
be unable to condemn inequalities above the threshold as long as at least one person 
is still below it. Nonetheless, I hold that such indifference can be understood and 
justified from the point of view of quiescent sufficiency, and I will try to explain why 
with an example. For the sake of simplicity, imagine a society with only three per-
sons, in which person A controls 20 units of wealth, B controls 40 units, and C 
controls 50 units, while the sufficiency threshold is set at 25. According to quiescent 
sufficiency, we should remain indifferent, from the point of view of justice, about 
whether the gap between B and C becomes wider or narrower as long as A remains 
below 25.  
I believe that this conclusion is not unreasonable. Assume that we have the 
chance of allocating four extra units of resources. It is irrelevant to ponder whether 
it is more just to give them to the second wealthiest or the wealthiest person, because 
first we ought to help the poorest one to come closer to the sufficiency threshold. 
We might incur the problem of indifference only in those cases in which we are 
unable to reach person A or she cannot convert the resources into wellbeing
55
. 
When this happens we have to bite the bullet and accept that C can increase the 
gap with B without committing an injustice. Whereas, if we have six units to redis-
tribute, we first ought to allocate five units to A so that she can meet the sufficiency 
threshold, but at this point the sufficiency principle would become dormant, so the 
allocation of the remaining unit would be regulated by the non-emergency distribu-
tive principle that we have previously chosen.  
It might still be objected that even within disposable sufficiency the indifference 
problem might bring about cases of moral inconsistency, because we might lack 
reasons for preferring an outcome in which A is led to sufficiency by drawing re-
sources from B rather than from C or by allocating new ones. So, for example, with 
the sufficiency threshold remaining set at 25, if we start from the previous Status 
quo (A20, B40, C 50), Outcome 1 (A 23, B 37, C 50) would be as just as Outcome 
 
55 This latter case can occur if A cannot consume the resources we are distributing—for medical 
reasons for example—and she cannot convert them into cash on the market either.  
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2 (A 23, B 40, C 50) and Outcome 3 (A 23, B 40, C 53). This is true. As long as 
the sufficiency regime holds, a sacrifice from a person barely above sufficiency 
might be considered at par with an equal sacrifice from another person who is well 
above the threshold. Nonetheless, three things can be said to partially defend this 
sufficientarian radicality. The first one is that such horizontality in the responsibility 
to help persons in dire need might render the transfer of resources more fluid and 
efficient. So, in our example, B could not appeal to C’s reluctance to redistribute to 
A as an excuse for inaction. In some way, this feature of sufficientarianism could 
oblige the person who could quickly direct resources below the threshold to do it.  
The second point, which is also connected to the first one, is that even if B re-
nounces something in order to let A reach the threshold, while C maintains her 
position unaltered, when sufficiency will become dormant B will be poorer than C 
than she was earlier, and this can count for the non-emergency principle of justice, 
hence we might expect B to reduce the gap with C in the post-sufficiency scenario. 
Consider, for example, Outcome 1 (A 23, B 37, C 50) and Outcome 3 (A 23, B 
40, C 53). Even though C can increase her gap with B in the pre-sufficiency scenario 
without incurring in injustice, once the sufficiency principle will go into abeyance 
the post-sufficiency principle of justice may require a redistribution from C to B. In 
this sense, we might say that Outcome 1 and Outcome 3 are on a par only as long 
as A will control less than 25 resources.  
Lastly, a clause could be added, so that after the adoption of the quiescent-suffi-
ciency paradigm, no one can be asked to renounce something she had earlier if the 
pace of economic growth is high enough to achieve the sufficiency goal in the short 
run. So, under this clause, if we start from the Status quo (A 20, B 40, C 50), Out-
come 1 (A 23, B 37, C 50) can no longer be considered at par with Outcome 2 (A 
23, B 40, C 50), but the latter, if achievable, should be preferred.  
As we can see, the great difference between quiescent sufficiency and classical 
sufficiency is that in the former the negative thesis, according to which inequalities 
occurring among people above sufficiency are irrelevant from the point of view of 
justice, holds true only as long as someone is still below the sufficiency threshold. 
When everyone has finally met the threshold, it will go into abeyance, ready to be 
reactivated in case even just one person once again falls below sufficiency. Another 
way to figure out the difference between quiescent sufficiency and classic sufficiency 
is to imagine what would happen if with a magic wand we were able to carry every-
one above sufficiency. As followers of classic sufficiency, we would have to remain 
indifferent, from the prospective of justice, about everything that occurs in this hy-
pothetical world. Accordingly, we could not even sanction a possible social evolu-
tion in which one single individual accumulates most of existing wealth, while all the 
other human beings remain just above sufficiency – in this scenario, it might be in 
the interest of the richest individual to redistribute to all the others just enough re-
sources to keep them above the threshold, so as to neutralise any sufficientarian 
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demand56. Whereas, if we have adhered to quiescent sufficiency, in the post-suffi-
ciency world, we can oppose inequalities through the non-emergency axiological 
principle of justice that comes into play once the sufficiency principle has been put 
into abeyance. 
Yet, it could be counter-argued that people might continuously cross the thresh-
old; therefore, the non-emergency distributive principle could never be triggered 
and, in practice, there would not be any difference between quiescent sufficientari-
anism and classic sufficientarianism. This is why I previously suggested that suffi-
ciency should not be simply considered as a (temporary) distributive principle. Ra-
ther, it should be seen as a reformist political project that can only been realised 
with the creation of public institutions aimed at sustaining sufficiency over time.  
Once the ‘central aspects of human life’
57
 have been individuated and agreed 
upon—I think, for example, of healthcare, nutrition, schooling, housing, and so on—
we should introduce supplementary public institutions that can guarantee basic ca-
pabilities with regards to every aspect that we consider as central to all those people 
who fail to do so on their own through market mechanism. If these public institu-
tions work efficiently, there are good chances that sufficiency will be guaranteed to 
everyone in the long run. We could then shift to the non-emergency principle of 
distributive justice. In sum, achieving sufficiency should be considered as an accom-
plishable political transformation in which the interests of those above sufficiency 
cannot take any priority over the creation of the institutions aimed at guaranteeing 
stable sufficiency to those who still fall short of it. 
A different objection that might be raised against the account of sufficiency I am 
proposing here consists in the fact that it could never be conclusively put into abey-
ance, hence we could not sustain the post-sufficiency distributive principle for a long 
period, because what is needed to achieve sufficiency changes with time. A clear 
example of this is the internet. Until a few years ago a credible threshold of suffi-
ciency would not have included internet access, while nowadays many people would 
perceive as inadequate a condition in which they were denied the possibility to get 
their devices connected to the web, because they could not be properly informed 
about what happens in the world, could not communicate with the loved ones who 
live far (or perhaps migrated), could not take part to some forms of participatory 
 
56 Consider that this hypotetical situation is not so different from the case of small elites ruling in 
oil-rich countries and redistributing wealth to the population through financing welfare state provi-
sions. This is also in order to guarantee stability to their own regime. See, for example, Laura El-
Katiri, Bassam Fattouh and Paul Segal, ‘Anatomy of an Oil-Based Welfare State: Rent Distribution 
in Kuwait’, in The Transformation Of the Gulf: Politics, Economics And the Global Order, eds. 
David Held and Kristian C. Ulrichsen (Abingdon – UK: Routledge, 2011).  
57 Axelsen and Nielsen, ‘Freedom from Duress’, 406. 
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democracy through which small communities may happen to tackle collective prob-
lems58.   
This example is particularly effective, because it shows that in order to achieve 
sufficiency it is not enough to give people purchasing power, rather you also need 
to create the conditions for the goods needed for sufficiency to be achievable and 
affordable. In this case, the social duty consists in the first place in the construction 
of the infrastructures through which data can be transmitted, and in the second place 
in rendering the costs of connection affordable for the worst off.  
This being the case, it can be argued that a person who reached sufficiency 30 
years ago, because provided with the resources for health, food, shelter, and so on, 
might end up below the sufficiency threshold some decades later, because even 
though her welfare level has not changed, the sufficiency threshold has moved up 
to incorporate internet access, and this person happens to live in a place where 
infrastructures are so poor that internet is not accessible at a reasonable price. In 
this case, given that the threshold has changed, we need to reactivate sufficiency, 
hence a sufficiency threshold cannot be conclusively put into quiescent mode59. 
The objection is correct and it captures the temporal dimension of my proposal, 
meaning than any sufficiency threshold, be it impartial or subjective, may change 
with time. Accordingly, with ‘quiescent’ I refer to the fact that in the period of time 
t0-t1 we employ threshold T, and in this period of time sufficiency is met, and hence 
its correlative threshold can go into abeyance mode, only if every person who is 
alive reaches T. Yet, as we have seen, at time t1 the emergence of new needs may 
lead us to the conclusion that T should be replaced with T1. When this occurs 
without T having been put into abeyance mode, because some people still fall short 
of it, we simply replace an operative T with an operative T1. If, on the contrary, T 
was already dormant, we simply introduce a new sufficiency threshold T1, that will 
remain in place from time t1 to time t2, until either T1 will be replaced by T2 (which 
takes into account some new needs that still have to emerge) or T1 will get into 
abeyance mode.  
This last aspect is particularly important. Let’s consider, for example, the situa-
tion in which T is already dormant, hence we have adopted a different principle of 
distributive justice for allocating burdens and benefits of social cooperation, say a 
form of egalitarianism, and we realise that our previous benchmark for sufficiency 
is now ‘insufficient’ and that we need to refer to T1, for the reasons related to inter-
net access that we were discussing before. When this occurs, helping those who lack 
 
58 It is not a case that an addition was recently made to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights to recognise the importance of sharing information through the web. See Catherine 
Howell and Darrell M. West, ‘The Internet as a human right’, The Brookings Institution (November 
7, 2016), retrievable from: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/11/07/the-internet-as-a-hu-
man-right/. 
59 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for articulating such an objection, specifically referring 
to the case of the Internet. 
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internet access to get it will become our unique concern, meaning that any resource 
that will be employed for something different will give rise to an injustice. Here we 
can make sense of the radicality of quiescent sufficiency (in comparison to other 
non-sufficientarian accounts of justice that eschew the ‘indifference objection’), be-
cause it will temporarily establish a state of emergency that would not allow for any 
trade-off between those who are above and those who are below the threshold that 
is in force in the period t1-t2. 
There remains to consider one last issue. In this article, and in particular in the 
last part of it, I have mainly centred my analysis on what is supposed to occur above 
the threshold, given that my main target has been to rescue sufficientarianism from 
the ‘indifference objection’. In doing this, I have considered some possible theoret-
ical evolutions, in the interests of the worst off, firstly from utilitarianism to welfare- 
prioritarianism, secondly from welfare-prioritarianism to either income- or capabil-
ity-prioritarianism, thirdly from income- or capability-prioritarianism to classic suf-
ficientarianism, and lastly from classic sufficientariansim to quiescent sufficientari-
ansim.   
My final argument is that the most effective way to guarantee priority to the worst 
off, preventing trade-offs between the top and the bottom and at the same time 
retaining axiological leverage above the threshold, is to uphold a temporary suffi-
ciency threshold (or multiple thresholds) and to guarantee absolute priority to those 
people who are below it while letting capability-prioritarianism regulate the interac-
tions between them. Yet, it might be wondered why I am proposing capability-pri-
oritarianism to regulate the interactions among the worst off if in my discussion I 
have presented the evolution from prioritarianism – in any of its variants – to suffi-
cientarianism as a positive advance for the same worst off.  
As discussed in the example of the child miners, the reason why none of the 
prioritarian variants can unconditionally guarantee priority to the worst off is that it 
will always remain possible for a large group of the best off obtaining huge benefits 
to outweigh a restricted group of the worst off achieving small increases in wellbeing. 
The sufficiency threshold neutralises these trade-offs by imposing a zero weighting 
factor to the utilities accruing at the top. Below the threshold we can have several 
options: we could employ the utility principle, any of the prioritarian variants or 
radical sufficiency. The latter is the view according to which sufficiency has intrinsic 
significance, hence when we have few resources to allocate, our guiding maxim 
should consist in leading above sufficiency as much individuals as possible.   
Reformulating an example I was doing before in pure numerical terms, let us 
imagine that three persons are in urgent need of a medicine to stop feeling pain. 
None of them is at risk of dying, but if they do not receive the medicine they will 
fell pain for the next week, until rescuers will be able to reach them. Adrian is very 
sick and needs seven doses of medicine to stop his suffering, Julian is sick and needs 
five doses, Elisabeth is only starting to feel bad now and would need only one dose 
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not to get worse. We have only two doses at our disposal and we do not know 
anything about these three persons. We can assume that we are only aware of their 
specific conditions and we are unable to communicate with them. Who should be 
given the two doses?   
From a strict sufficientarian prospective, Elisabeth should be given at least one 
dose, so as to lead her above the sufficiency threshold. Whereas, the other dose 
should be given to Julian, even though this will only lead him closer to sufficiency 
but not above it, and we know that it is very unlikely that he may find elsewhere the 
remaining four doses he would necessitates. From a capability-prioritarian prospec-
tive, the two doses should instead be given to Adrian in order to make the person 
who is worst off fell a little better60, even though this entails renouncing to carry at 
least one person above sufficiency.  
I am proposing the adoption of capability-prioritarianism below the threshold 
because, as it has been shown in this example, it can guarantee absolute priority to 
the worst off, without trade-offs that are internal to the worst off group and might 
sacrifice the interests of those who are at the very bottom vis-à-vis the worst off who 
are closer to the sufficiency threshold. This also means that the sufficiency fetishism 
might have the consequence of justifying inequalities between the most vulnerable 
individuals of society. Obviously, adopting capability-prioritariansim below suffi-
ciency does not mean to rehabilitate prioritarianism tout court, because it can serve 
the guiding principle I have adopted in this article only if applied below a sufficiency 
threshold. The guiding principle being to unconditionally safeguard the interests of 
the worst off61.  
 
CONCLUSION 
I have claimed that utilitarianism could penalize those who are worse off in cases 
in which utility does not decline at the margin and that the prioritarian clause could 
solve this problem. Nonetheless, in weighting individual utilities we should not focus 
on welfare levels, as prioritarian philosophers usually maintain. Rather, we should 
refer to a scale of weighting factors that is realized in inverse proportion either to 
social income or to capabilities, because in doing so we can avoid the risk of inegali-
tarian drifts due to adaptive preferences, to which both utilitarianism and welfare 
prioritarianism may fall prey. 
Then, I have dealt with the issue of trade-offs between the top and the bottom of 
society that are allowed within prioritarianism. As claimed, the sufficientarian 
 
60 The same holds true in the case of welfare-prioritarianism. 
61 I am extremely grateful to two anonymous reviewers for helping me formulate this version of 
quiescent sufficientarism, by raising, among other things, many of the objections that I have addressed 
in this paragraph. 
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threshold can guarantee an absolute priority to the worse off, but this comes at the 
price of the negative thesis of sufficientarianism, which can make the whole distrib-
utive principle vulnerable to the indifference objection. Therefore, I have posited 
to interpret sufficientarianism as a temporary principle of distributive justice that 
remains active as long as insufficiency exists and that becomes dormant once every 
member of society has crossed the sufficiency threshold. From this perspective, suf-
ficientarianism can be seen as a transformative project for society, aimed at building 
up the institutions that should safeguard sufficiency over time. 
I have sought to argue that we can envision a positive theoretical evolution from 
utilitarianism to income- or capability-prioritarianism and from income- or capabil-
ity-prioritarianism to quiescent sufficiency. At each step, we maintain the advantages 
of the previous theory while correcting for its most explicit drawbacks. In the final 
analysis, quiescent sufficiency coupled with capability-prioritariansim below the 
threshold can guarantee absolute priority to the poorest persons under all circum-
stances, without renouncing the sufficientarian positive thesis and without remaining 
indifferent to the inequalities that occur among the better off.   
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